Previous Articles

In March 1996, when Chinese ballistic missiles were splashing into waters off Taiwan's two major ports-closing the heavily-traveled Taiwan Strait to international maritime traffic for days-the Clinton Administration sent two carrier task forces to the vicinity to persuade Beijing to quiet things down. But none of the commanders on those American ships had ever done contingency consulting with Taiwan defense officials. Nor did they have secure communication links to Taiwan's navy.

Shaven-headed Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage has the imposing physique of a professional wrestler and is not usually pestered by inquisitive foreign reporters. But on May 18, two Chinese-language television crews stood in his way as he emerged from a Senate hearing room after a grilling on the administration's strategy in Iraq. Rather than barrel through the wall of microphones, betacams, and floodlamps, one of the Chinese reporters told me later, the burly deputy secretary stopped.

 In 2001, President George W. Bush's administration dumped the Bill Clinton policy of "strategic ambiguity" on China-Taiwan, but he replaced it with something worse: strategic ambivalence. And this ambivalence is leaving both Beijing and Taipei dangerously confused about American goals in the East Asia.

Taiwan's participation in the World Health Organization (WHO) will be a major topic at the World Health Assembly (WHA) in Geneva on May 17-22, 2004. The United States should take the lead in supporting Taiwan's participation in the WHO and other international bodies because it is in the U.S. national interest. The more Taiwan is accepted into the international community as a valuable contributor, the less legitimate is China's claim of a legal right to use force against Taiwan. Delegitimizing the use of force in the Taiwan Strait also lessens the likelihood of conflict.