“Afterthoughts On Reykjavik” - “Firing Line” William F. Buckley interviews Henry A. Kissinger

 

“Firing Line”  William F. Buckley interviews Henry A. Kissinger   

“Firing Line”  William F. Buckley interviews Henry A. Kissinger   “Afterthoughts On Reykjavik,” Collection Title: Firing Line broadcast records Guest: Kissinger, Henry (1923-) Date Created: January 13, 1987

https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/6900

 

Collection Structure: Firing Line broadcast records > Episode guide> Afterthoughts on Reykjavik

 

Item Title: Afterthoughts on Reykjavik

 

 

Host: Buckley, William F., Jr.(1925-2008)

 

 

Description:

 

When in doubt, consult "no less than Talleyrand himself," as WFB puts it; and so … 

 

… to explicate Reykjavik and the European reaction to it, we're off on a bracing hour with the man who, agree with him or not, has seen more and done more in international affairs than anyone else now living. One sample from Mr. Kissinger: "Gromyko was rather rigid and morbidly suspicious. Gromyko was like an African rhino who charged in a straight line, always quite predictably. 

 

Now they've got Dobrynin there, who was ambassador in Washington and who must have taught them that “what you see is what you get, and you can afford to accept American proposals because they indeed may not be in the American interest. They may result from a bureaucratic compromise.”

 

Subject(s):

Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeevich, 1931-

Reagan, Ronald

Reagan-Gorbachev Summit Meeting, Reykjavik, Iceland, 1986

Place Recorded: New York City, New York, United States

 

Dimensions: Duration: 60 minutes

Format: Text

Medium: television programs

 

Hoover ID: Program S0723

Record Number: 80040.966

Notes: Video not currently available for purchase.

 

Collection Guide: https://oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/kt6m3nc88c

 

 

 

Yale University Library

findit.library.yale.edu

 

E L63 

 

BUCKLEY:  Dr. Kissinger is, on top of everything else, a syndicated columnist, and his first commentary on the Reykjavik summit expressed much less than the enthusiasm so many feel at the prospect of the elimination of nuclear force from our lives. He outlined what he called three"components of the Reykjavik Revolution," and I think we will remind ourselves what these were, eliciting from him comments on them one at a time. 

 

The first was "an agreement to reduce strategic forces by 50 per cent, with a moratorium for 10 years on deployment of the Strategic Defense Initiative." 

 

[ Component (1): Fifty Percent Reduction]

 

Question: Dr. Kissinger, what's wrong with a 50 per cent reduction in strategic forces? Have you got a weakness for nuclear weapons? 

 

KISSINGER:  May I explain, first, my general approach to the issue.    [I believe that] the Reagan Administration and President Reagan, due to the restoration of American Self Confidence, the buildup of American Military force and a number of other steps he as taken, and due to the weakness, or at least domestic problems of the Soviet Union, is in a uniquely favorable negotiating position.  Indeed, one asks oneself, if we do not get a change in the situation out of this negotiating position, when, ever, are we going to get it?  

 

So, I would be dubious about any arrangement that does no better than leave things unchanged, and I would indeed be worried if the situation worsened.

 

Now, with respect to the “Fifty Percent Cut” my major concern is that it makes no significant difference in the strategic situation as it is.  Indeed from a “systems analyst’s” point of view, if it doesn’t make a difference, it slightly worsens the situation …

 

BUCKLEY:  Explain that, if you will.

 

KISSINGER:  There are three major problems with respect to strategic nuclear weapons.

 

[Three Major Problems with Nuclear Weapons Negotiations]

 

One, the possibility of surprise attack or a “first strike”.  

 

Second, the reliance on mass … on a strategy, of  “Mutual Assured Destruction”, which relies on heavy civilian casualties; and 

 

Third, a corollary of this, in fact it is more or less the same, so maybe there are two issues . . . the capacity for major civilian [infrastructure] destruction… 

 

[Deception of Surprise Attack]

 

With respect to the first, the launch of a surprise attack:  

 

[MIRV]

 

That is produced by the fact that modern missiles have multiple warheads, therefore, one missile can threaten several defending missiles, if it has ten warheads, it can threaten ten defending missiles. 

 

A fifty percent cut in missile forces that does not affect the number of warheads on each missiledoes NOT reduce the vulnerability of the missiles, in fact, it makes calculations with respect to attacking them simpler.  Because, now, there are fewer launchers that have to be attacked …

 

BUCKLEY:  For a first strike, therefore? …

 

KISSINGER:  … Therefore, it is technically easier to plan a first strike against fewer missiles as long as the ratio of warheads to missiles remains unchanged. As long as the ratio of warheads to missiles remains unchanged.

 

[Anti Submarine warfare]

 

Second, with respect to submarine launched missiles; no projected agreement takes care … includes antisubmarine forces.  Therefore, to cut our submarine force in half – and in fact it will have to be cut in more than half in order to achieve the limits – means that the same number of Soviet antisubmarine forces are now chasing

 

BUCKLEY:  … half as many …

 

KISSINGER: … half as many submarines. 

 

So, obviously, the vulnerability of submarines will increase.  

 

And all of this is purchased at no improvement to the vulnerability of civilian populations, because the number of warheads that will remain after a fifty percent cut, which is about five-to-six thousand, is twice as many as Kennedy had at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis.  

 

So, I believe that the fifty percent cut has some symbolic significance; some propagandistic significance; it does not make a significant, substantive, difference.  

 

If it stood by itself, I could live with it. 

 

BUCKLEY:  Umhmm

 

KISSINGER:  But I would not consider it a huge achievement.

 

BUCKLEY:  Well, I’m going to interrupt my own intended enumeration of the other two components, because of the way you answered that first question, to say that … to observes as follows:  Why is it that we have an administration whose own interests, to say nothing of those of “The Republic,” vests very heavily in realism, in evaluating the nature of the nuclear problem, encouraging the notion that a symbolic reduction is of any use whatever, given the fact that unless we reduce to the point of reaching the apocalyptic threshold, which would be … what? … a reduction of 97 or 98 percent, in fact, we do not enhance the probable safety of the civilian population.  In fact, as you just analyzed, we’re probably going in the other direction.

 

So, why would something as rudimentary as what you have analyzed not be shot-down instantly by sober thought?

 

KISSINGER:  May I make just one technical point before I answer that question?

 

BUCKLEY:  Sure.

 

[Deception]

 

KISSINGER:  The technical point would be that if it were possible, for example, to eliminate multiple warheads, then if we were in a single-warhead world, or if we returned to a single-warhead world, then at least the danger of a first-strike could be reduced, but you are quite right.  The vulnerability of the civilian population would not be affected until you reached a very unre- … a limit so low that you cannot really imagine it as part of an arms control agreement, because it would be so close to zero, that it would then raise the question of how many weapons can be hidden.

                            

BUCKLEY:  Right.

 

[Question of What is ‘Minimum Force’ assuming deception]

 

KISSINGER:  And, you’d be right back to the original problem of “what is a minimum force?”  

 

Now, how was it possible that the Reagan Administration that used to castigate its … for its obsession with arms control, and that, certainly, in its assessment of Soviet Intentions has been very rigorous.  How could it get into this position?

 

I think there are many explanations.  One is, at the end of the day, any president wants to go down in history as having made progress towards peace.  And in the American mythology “Peace” is often considered a static condition in which tensions have disappeared . . .

 

BUCKLEY:  Yes, and there’s an aspect of the size of the arsenal …

 

KISSINGER:  … That’s right … so therefore, he will look, as time goes on, for some agreement…  But Why This Agreement?  Well, with all respect, many of the original supporters of President Reagan used to attack the Arms Control negotiations of his predecessors on the grounds that they only froze the existing programs and did not REDUCE them.  So that “Reductions” became an article of faith of many of the original supporters of President Reagan’s.  So that, within the Administration, almost anything that can be represented as a “Reduction” seems to validate the original goal.

 

BUCKLEY:  So, it’s the tyranny of the superstitious symbol that tends to take over.

 

 

[Fallacies of ‘Least Damage’ and ‘Negotiating within the Bureaucracy’]

 

KISSINGER:  Yes.  Now, this is what the Administration is faced with in terms of its own rhetoric.  The Government departments, especially the State Department, the Arms Control Agency, and so forth, they are in favor, fundamentally, of any agreement that can be negotiated.  So, they tend to look around for the various proposals that, in their view, do least damage to American interests, since they believe that an “Agreement” is desirable in itself. 

 

[Problem of intra-bureaucracy negotiation] 

 

And then, usually a struggle develops – between those who want negotiation and those who are very suspicious – which the President has to resolve as the negotiation approaches.

 

And, all the bureaucratic pressures are in the direction of accepting that which, at a minimum, he considers doesn’t do any damage.

 

BUCKLEY:  To what extent was this a fact in causing acquiescence in SALT I?

 

KISSINGER:  In SALT I … of course, we had a totally difference domestic situation.  In SALT I, we had a shrinking defense budget imposed on us by the Congress.  We could not get approval of any new program, and the Soviets were building.   But it was a factor in the sense that the Nixon Administration, in which I served, became convinced that the Ballistic Missile Defense which we were building at the time was on the verge of being gutted by the Congress, that had already reduced it from twelve defense sites to two, so that one was looking around for a solution that, at least, rescued something. 

 

It’s not exactly analogous to the present situation.  But any President, including the ones I served, if he is not very careful, will find himself confronted with imminent deadlines and with proposals that he is reluctant to reject because, if they don’t do obvious damage, you have a proclivity to go along with them.

 

BUCKLEY:  Well, given the tyranny of numbers here, and the widely held superstition that 49 is that much better than 50; and 48 is that much better than 49; how do you account for the enthusiasm for SALT I and SALT II, given the demonstrated record that, in fact, there was a huge increase in warheads following both … well, I won’t call the second one a “Treaty” since it was never confirmed, but following the first treaty and the second signature?

 

KISSINGER:  Since you are asking the person who was in office when SALT I was being negotiated … and since I don’t want to establish the principle of admitting a mistake on television, 

 

BUCKLEY:  [Laughing] … Or anywhere else …

 

KISSINGER:  … I will have to explain, ah, what WE thought we were doing.  After all, fifteen years have passed since then.  In 1972, we faced the problem that the Soviets were building some 200 missiles per year, and we could not get any additional programs through the Congress.  We had the Vietnam War, we had a big Peace Movement in the United States, so we considered it a considerable accomplishment that we froze the numbers of launchers at the levels which had then been reached.

 

BUCKLEY:  Without anticipating that they had MIRVed them?

 

KISSINGER:  No, no.  We were MIRVing …

 

BUCKLEY: … I know we were …

 

[Deception – more launchers meant Second Strike more Difficult]

 

KISSINGER:  and that gave us a certain numerical … ahh … compensation for their larger numbers.  We thought they would MIRV, and we thought we had … the SALT I agreement was for five years, during the course of which a permanent agreement was to be negotiated.   And, in the course of that, we were going to take account of the MIRV problem.  And, indeed, as soon as SALT I was signed, we made a whole series of proposals to limit the number of MIRVed missiles, all of which the Soviet Union rejected.

 

So, we then witnessed, NOT an increase in the number of launchers, but an increase in the number of warheads that could be put on launchers.  And that genie has never been put back into the bottle. And therefore  in 1987, we face a totally difference situation from the one we faced in 1972, when we were compensating with multiple warheads for the larger number of Soviet launchers.  

 

BUCKLEY:  It nevertheless is correct, is it not, that people are constantly saying about President Reagan, “you see, he’s never concluded an Arms Limitation Agreement, and by contrast, Carter did,” (even though it was not confirmed by the Senate), and by contrast Nixon did, and this is a kind of a thoughtless indictment, is it not?

 

KISSINGER:  I am not …[worried?] …  what President Reagan has done up til now in Arms Control Negotiations.  I’m worried about what he might do in the future.  I am worried about the agreement that he might sign, not about an agreement he has not signed.

 

BUCKLEY:  Okay, 

 

KISSINGER:  But it’s not a fair indictment, to answer your question.

 

[Component (2): Withdrawal of all MRBMs from Europe]

 

BICKLEY:  Quite right, let’s continue with the other two components as you listed them of the Reykjavik Agreement.  The second was an agreement to withdraw US and Soviet missiles of ranges of 1500 kilometers from Western Europe and European Russia.   Now, your skepticism about THAT “component” is based on what?

 

KISSINGER:  My skepticism about that is based on the political situation in Europe; and on the theory on which the deployment of medium range missiles to Europe was based to begin with.  The problem Europe faces with respect to nuclear weapons is that the Soviet Union can attack Europe from 1) its own territory, 2) from its satellite territory, with weapons of various ranges.  

 

The United States cannot retaliate against the Soviet Union from Europe.   Therefore, the problem arises in the mind of the Europeans – and maybe in the minds of the Soviets – whether, in the case of a nuclear threat confined to Europe, the United States would retaliate from American soil!  Especially in light of the situation we discussed earlier, where any war is likely to involve scores of millions of casualties in a matter of days in a nuclear war.  

 

So, the deployment of medium range ballistic missiles to Europe, one, created a condition in which an attack on Europe would produce a retaliation FROM Europe; and secondly, would make the retaliation against the Soviet Union completely automatic, because it would be unlikely that the United States would permit its weapons in Europe to be attacked without using them.   And it would be improbable that the United States would permit a conventional attack to overrun these weapons without using them. 

 

[Link U.S. and Allies’ defenses in an ‘organic manner’]

 

So, these weapons were a way to couple the defense of Europe to the Defense of the United States in an organic manner.

 

Secondly, every European country paid a heavy domestic price, in the face of massive demonstrations, strongly supported by the Soviet Union, in 1982 and 83, when these weapons were being …

 

BUCKLEY:  … deployed …

 

KISSINGER --- deployed.  Now, less than three years later, the United States offers to withdrawal of its weapons, in return for the Soviets withdrawing weapons of comparable ranges.

 

BUCKLEY:  Mmm-hmm  

 

[Withdrawing MRBMs, No USSR threat reduction to Europe, yet US counter- threat is eliminated]

 

KISSINGER:  But that doesn’t solve the European problem, because there are about, I think about 350 [Soviet] medium range weapons that can threaten Europe, but there are about [Soviet] 850 short-range weapons that can also cover all of Europe, plus hundreds of [Soviet] intercontinental weapons that can threaten Europe.  

 

So, the nuclear threat to Europe is barely diminished, but American presence which could react to that threat is totally eliminated – POINT ONE.

 

POINT TWO:  All the European governments that paid a horrendous price domestically for getting these weapons in, now have to explain why they paid a price to get these weapons introduced, and why the fundamental factors that produced a need for them is not eliminated.

 

Now, it is true that in 1982, the “Zero Option” was offered by all of the Allies, the option that is now being implemented. But, I think one had to be sophisticated enough to understand the Bureaucratic lineup.  It was put forward in America by our Defense Department, which was extremely skeptical …

 

BUCKLEY:  … on the assumption that it wouldn’t be accepted.

 

[US DoD misled that USSR will believe US deception]

 

KISSINGER:  … and it wasn’t accepted, for two reasons.  We didn’t have any weapons there to begin with, and the Soviets didn’t want to trade 400 [weapons] for nothing.  And secondly because Gromyko was rather rigid and morbidly suspicious. Gromyko was like an African rhino who charged in a straight line, always quite predictably. Now they've got Dobrynin there, who was ambassador in Washington and who must have taught them that “what you see is what you get, and you can afford to accept American proposals because they indeed may not be in the American interest. They may result from a bureaucratic compromise.”

 

So, now, I have seen the other day that the Secretary of State said in The New York Times, that we’ve done no more than implement what the Europeans have accepted.  Which is true.  But, the Europeans never thought it would happen!

 

BUCKLEY:  [Laughing] Yeah! 

 

[Allies’ must be included in nuclear talks]

 

KISSINGER:  … and they sort of looked to us to save them 

 

BUCKLEY:  … to abort it …

 

KISSINGER:  … to abort it, and now they are stuck with a situation where they cannot admit they are uneasy, but they ARE uneasy.

 

BUCKLEY:  In fact, they HAVE admitted that they’re uneasy, haven’t they?

 

KISSINGER:  They have admitted…. Well, not as strongly as they feel.

 

BUCKLEY: Among other things, Mitterrand has said he would not cooperate in any such venture, which technically invalidates it, because with the Reykjavik [pronounces it “Rek-DZHA-vik”] terms… didn’t they require compliance with? …

 

KISSINGER:  NO!  There was another point.  In addition to the removal of American missiles, the United States seems to have proposed “Reykjavík” … forgive me for not pronouncing it accurately …. ahh … or maybe you’re not pronouncing it accurately … 

 

BUCKLEY:  [Laughter]

 

KISSINGER: … the American side seems to have proposed at Reykjavík that ALL strategic missiles would be eliminated.  That would then touch on our strategic missiles, as well as the British and French missile forces.  

 

Now, Mitterand has made absolutely clear, as has Mrs. Thatcher, that under no circumstances would they agree to that part of the proposal.  And, I don’t know whether we consider that proposal to be on the table.   But the Zero American and Soviet missiles technically does not affect …

 

BUCKLEY:  Do the 1500-kilometer ones have to do with missiles that we have total sovereignty over? 

 

KISSINGER:  exactly

 

BUCKLEY:  so we can with draw them … however … is it not correct that before Mr. Reagan got back from RAKE … ZHA vik … ah … there were instantaneous protests in London and in Paris and in West Germany … over the implications ….

 

KISSINGER :  absolutely 

 

BUCKLEY:  They recognize this linkage factor to which you just referred.  

 

KISSINGER:  … of coupling the defense of Europe with the defense of the

 

BUCKLEY: … yes, you said 

 

KISSINGER:  … I have known the European leaders personally for a long time, and I will assert flatly that I know none now in office, with maybe one or two—

 

BUCKLEY: Scandinavian exceptions?

 

KISSINGER: None of the major countries -- is at ease about the withdrawal of American missiles from Europe, even in return for the withdrawal of a certain category of Soviet missiles, even though for domestic reasons they cannot attack it as all out as they feel... 

 

BUCKLEY:  Before we go back to that and generalize, let me, for the sake of form, mention the third component which you quoted as follows:  “An American proposal to do away with all ballistic missiles over a ten-year period, countered by a Soviet proposal to do away with all strategic forces, or, in its even more exalted form, all nuclear weapons,” … now we’re getting into real “Angelism” aren’t we?   However, it was on the table at Reykjavik, the idea of eliminating all nuclear bombs, coupled with the ironic point that only then would we be permitted to deploy SDI, right?

 

[ Component (3): Elimination of BMD]

 

KISSINGER: yes..

 

BUCKLEY:  … when it was useless.  Now, is that third component simply to be dismissed, given the number of holes in it, which you went on to analyze in your essay as simply an exercise in idealistic exuberance?  For the sake of, ah, 

                                                        

[Deception]

 

KISISNGER:  what was worrisome about the proposal was that the United States could even conceive making it in the present circumstances, because, even assuming that the Soviets had accepted the elimination of all missiles, we would then be in a world of airplanes, again, in which now, I think most people agree that Soviet air defenses are so strong, that if you cannot attack it with missiles, it’s questionable whether you can get through with airplanes.  

 

At least many experts would have serious questions about it.  Conversely, we have no air defense at all!   And all the problems I’ve mentioned about the number of warheads on a missile are made more acute because there are many more airplanes on any one airfield than there are warheads on a missile.  So, it’s relatively easier to attack the fifty or seventy-five airfields we have in the absence of an American air defense.  So the ironical result of this position would be that, if we were serious about it, we would have to spend a lot of money building air defense against airplanes if we’re not going to be totally vulnerable.

 

BUCKLEY:  Is there something missing here? Are you saying that nuclear power is required to fuel an SDI defense?  Because I would have thought an SDI defense would be extremely useful against airplanes.  They’re slower …

 

KISSINGER:  SDI Defense … ahhh …. It depends what kind of an SDI defense you’re talking about.  I would have though that most of the space-based components of SDI would NOT be all that useful against aircraft.

 

BUCKLEY:  Why not?

 

KISSINGER:  Because … I’m no technical expert … my understanding has been that they’re aimed at trajectories that go very high, there are various phases of interception, that depend on [tracking] the “boost phase” which has certain energy components that are quite different from aircraft.  I have never heard the argument…

 

BUCKLEY:  I don’t want to correct you technically, but the SDI enthusiasts are telling us that they would be effective even for cruise missiles, in which case they would surely be effective against airplanes because they are atmospheric missiles.  

 

KISSINGER:  There are some components of SDI that would be effective against airplanes, what is called the so-called “terminal defense” … That should be effective against airplanes, but I think you would need a different configuration a different type of radar … but that’s not my major point.

 

My major point is quite different.  

 

One:  that proposal seems to have been made without any study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of what the military implications of such a world would be.

 

[REDUCES DETERRENCE]

 

Secondly:  the combination of all the proposals which you listed has the practical consequence of reducing, if not eliminating, the concept of “deterrence” that has governed the postwar world for thirty-to-forty years, which means that in case of a major attack on Europe, it would be highly probable, if not certain, that the United States would use nuclear weapons.  

 

That’s already been degraded by the kind of missile technology, but when you get into an airplane world, in which the use of these weapons, and even the targets, become infinitely more problematical.  It was the common view of almost all military experts that I know, that we would then need a totally different concept of the defense of Europe, quite at variance with the one that now exists.

 

BUCKLEY:  The one which you outlined, you said (A) would take fifteen years.  You said it would take 15 years to match the defensive power of the Soviet Union.   Secondly, it’s politically inconceivable that the sacrifices would be volunteered without such a conventional …

 

KISSINGER:  In every …

 

[Deception]

 

BUCKLEY:  You don’t talk about diminishing your deterrent power while that is problematic, do you?

 

KISSINGER:  In all, it consists of pressures to reduce the defense …

 

BUCKLEY:  Yeah, …

 

KISSINGER:   And the amount of prevention of weapons, it turns out, is extremely costly, drafts would have to be re-introduced in countries which do not now have a draft.  And at the end of this process, you would have to say that it’s the reality that after three-to-four hundred years it was never possible to establish a conventional balance that was plausible, hence there has been with conventional weapons very frequent wars.  Because, even if you had an equality of numbers, military history shows that the side that can concentrate its forces at a particular point, may be able to achieve a breakthrough or may BELIEVE it can achieve a breakthrough . ..  

 

BUCKLEY:  Well, how do you account for the phenomenon of the nineteenth century?

 

KISSINGER:  Well, in the nineteenth century, you had a number of wars, but you had minor wars, in the nineteenth century you had a combination of a balance of power which was rather artfully put together, together with the fact that, for one of the few times in history, the major governments had comparable domestic structures, so they did not feel ideologically threatened by other countries.  It is the one period in which conventional balances were maintained.

 

BUT, as soon as the ideological component began to disappear and as soon as there was a fundamental antagonism between France and Germany, so that the flexibility of these balances, and of the shifting alliances, disappeared, you got an armaments race which then, in time, triggered mobilization schedules, which in turn contributed importantly to World War I.

 

BUCKLEY:  Therefore, there is no sense in which the Nineteenth Century gave us a model which could be reconstructed given the differences in the ideological …

 

KISSINGER:  You have to remember, World War I which killed 20 million people, started to wild enthusiasm and every general staff must have believed they were going to win the War or they wouldn’t have entered it.  And, so, it cannot be in our interest to recreate a world in which at some moment huge armies with much more destructive weapons descend upon each other, especially as the knowledge of nuclear weapons cannot be suppressed by any of the schemes that have been discussed at Reykjavik and elsewhere.

 

BUCKLEY:  Yes, and the Second World War was a conventional war in which 55 million people were killed.

 

KISSINGER:  Exactly.

 

BUCKLEY:  Let me ask you this:  How do you handle, Mr. Kissinger, the argument so frequently made that we’ve got to come to terms with the apocalyptic increase inherent in modern warfare, i.e., unless we struggle to put the genie back into the bottle, we are going to live in a situation in which the Apocalypse becomes technically possible.  Do you answer that by saying, “Sure, it’s possible but there’s nothing we can do about the fact that it’s possible”?

 

[Deception: Nuclear Weapons are not the only or indeed the principle element of international tension]

 

KISSINGER:  No.  I’m in favor of negotiating with the Soviets, but I believe that they are … first of all, I don’t believe that the military component is the only, or indeed the principal, element of international tension, and I do not think you can reduce tension simply by manipulating the military component.  

 

[An Arms Control Agreement, to be advantageous, must IMPROVE the situation]

 

But with respect to the military component, what I ask for is that the proposals can demonstrably improve the situation.  They should not be intellectually beyond the wit of man.  I do not see why an agreement that makes no difference militarily should make a difference politically. 

 

Secondly, we have to face the fact that the tensions in the world have been caused by political decisions.  There is no law of nature that says that Soviet Union has to support a heavily militarized Cuba, that it has to put $600 million of economic and military aid into Nicaragua, or putting a billion dollars worth of arms into Angola, of fuelling the invasion with it’s political and military support.  In short, I’m saying that if the Soviet Union is prepared to stay within its own boundaries which, after all, is the greatest landmass in the world, so they’re not excessively constricting.   If they’re willing to stay within these boundaries, if they’re willing to accept some principles of restraint, and if that is coupled with some arms control agreements that make a genuine difference, then we can say we have achieved something.  

 

BUCKLEY:  Well. . . What kind of shrinkage would you applaud?  Well, de-MIRVing would be one, wouldn’t it?

 

 

[Deception – De-MIRVing] 

 

KISSINGER:  I believe de-MIRVing would be one.

 

BUCKLEY:  is that enforceable?

 

KISSINGER:  One would have to ask technicians. Since, now we’re living with restrictions on MIRVs and since we seem to be comfortable with that, it would seem to me easier in a de-MIRVed world.  I’m assuming it is enforceable, and if I am shown to be wrong on this then I  …

[Deception – Theatre Nuclear Weapons]

 

BUCKLEY:  By contrast, you said, that what would NOT be enforceable would be the end of theater nuclear weapons. They’re too easy to hide, aren’t they?

 

KISSINGER: … abolishing all nuclear weapons, because the first thing you would have to study is how many can be hidden and    how many would have to be conserved for the contingency of hidden weapons.  And you’d be right back to negotiating the minimum level of weapons. 

 

But I would add to this a component which we haven’t discussed, namely the Strategic Defenses.  I do not understand the argument that says Arms Control has to start by banning weapons that do not yet exist … 

 

[Strategic Defenses: 1) don’t yet exist; and 2) are defensive]

 

BUCKLEY:  … which are defensive in nature?

 

KISSINGER:  Which are defensive in nature.  Weapons that are aimed at weapons are supposed to be dangerous, while weapons that are aimed at people are supposed to be constructive and contributing to stability, so, as a concept for discussion, I would say if one could negotiate a balance between offensive and defensive forces so that the possibility of surprise attacks are eliminated or sharply reduced, and an attack on civilian populations would require such a massive assault as to be discouraged by its magnitude, then one would have made a contribution …

 

BUCKLEY: So, think of it in terms of units.  In other words, if you increase the units of offensive potential, you also increase the units of defensive potential.

 

 

[Deception: Long Moratorium means Pentagon reluctant to ask for funds, Congress reluctant to give them]

 

KISSINGER:  And conversely, [crosstalk] … And on that level, I’d be perfectly willing to admit Strategic Defense.  What makes me extremely uneasy about this Strategic Defense negotiation, and very uneasy if Reykjavik should be come the model for the future, which I fear it may become, is the combination of a very long moratorium on deployment which means the military will be very reluctant to ask for money, the Congress will be reluctant to appropriate it, coupled with restrictions on scientific research, even if “laboratory tests” are being defined to cover research outside the laboratory –

 

 -- a restriction on research must weigh more heavily on the United States than on the Soviet Union.  You know the restrictions will be much more heavily policed by the United States, by the Congress, by the scientific community, and we would err on the side of excessive strictness.

 

In the Soviet Union, what is “SDI Research” and what is “Civilian Research”, these lines are going to be eroded so that evolution can go in only one direction.  Either the Soviets will score a breakthrough, or its technically beyond them, but in any event, they have an absolute safety net.  

 

And, I’m opposed to limitations on research of any kind.  Limitations on deployment can be observed.  Limitations on research are beyond our …

 

BUCKLEY: … or on testing?

 

KISSINGER:  Or on testing.

 

BUCKLEY:  Now, it has gone, relatively speaking, widely unremarked, the emphasis the Soviet Union is placing right now on defensive mechanisms, right?  That is to say, $25 billion a year is a studied estimate of what they’re spending right now, while we are begrudging $4 billion a year on our own SDI.  

 

KISSINGER: Somebody made as study of Soviet scientific delegations that visit the United States, agitating against American strategic defense and found that 80% of the delegations members are working on the Soviet Strategic Defense program.

 

The Difference is, that the Soviets being behind us in certain aspects of technology have concentrated their strategic defense on surface based weapons.  

 

We have emphasized space-based weapons, and that is what they are really attacking in their SDI criticism.

 

BUCKLEY:  You say we’ve emphasized space-based weapons, in the sense that the ABM, the old ABMs , were concentrated on “terminal defense.”  That’s right?

 

KISSINGER:  The old ABM was based on terminal defense, in what was called, um, at any rate not space … they were launched from the ground. 

 

BUCKLEY:  Yes, but you’re not suggesting that they’re not also preparing for the atmospheric …

 

KISSINGER:  That presumes a capacity to miniaturize their components, which they haven’t achieved.

 

BUCKLEY:  Well, not, the Krasnoyarsk Radar site, which people have decided is a direct violation of the ABM Treaty, is designed, is it not, as a space-based SDI …  isn’t it?

 

[Deception]

 

KISSINGER:  It can be used for many purposes.  That radar site, which is about a thousand miles from where it’s permitted to be…  In the ABM Treaty of 1972, there was a provision that all radars had to be located at the periphery, it could be warning radars, but not battle management radars.  If they are located in the interior of the country they can then follow the trajectory of the missiles into the country, and they can therefore be hooked up with terminal defenses at a minimum.  No doubt, it would also be useful for space-based defense, but it is even a total violation of the agreement of 1972 with respect to the locations of radar sites.  

 

Now, the Soviets claim that this is a space-tracking radar station, and is therefore permitted under the agreement.  If this is true, it is the first space-tracking station oriented towards the horizon.

 

BUCKLEY: [laughter] … yeah … they never let us down, do they? The Soviets.

 

KISSINGER:  And this is something that’s the size of three football fields, and that they started building in 1980 long before any SDI concept was ever developed in the United States. And they continued building and for which there can be no conceivable justification in terms of the ABM Treaty of 1972. 

 

BUCKLEY:  Given that you’ve said that, and before I come to the concluding point of order I want to ventilate, you said you could understand prolonging from six months to one year, the period in order to serve notice that we were departing from the ABM Treaty.  Six months is what is incorporated into that understanding.

Now, I’m advised by legal scholars, that a Treaty, for instance, this particular one, could be terminated either by saying “ok, a six month countdown is beginning now, and next September we’re going to feel free to do what we want to do,”  or we can say “it’s null and void because you have not lived up to your obligations”  as you’ve just finished documenting, they have not.  So technically, tomorrow, we could terminate …

 

KISSINGER:  Oh yes …

 

BUCKLEY:  You have no quarrel with that?

 

KISSINGER:  I have no quarrel.  If you consider it in our interests to do …

 

BUCKLEY:  Yes.

 

KISSINGER: If I may make one point, since I don’t keep the time, I don’t know whether we are approaching the end.

 

BUCKLEY:  We have ten minutes.

 

KISSINGER:  Oh … the importance, if I may say so, of this discussion, is not just to beat to death what happened at Reykjavik.  My nightmare is that right after the German elections, the Soviets are going to make a proposal in which they package together more or less all the items they agreed to at Reykjavik, and make it read … Reykjavik broke down on the issue that they wanted to ban laboratory tests, and also the issue they obviously didn’t bank on the fact that President Reagan would pack up his delegation and leave. So, which was the best thing he did there.

 

Supposing they come back and say, “laboratory isn’t limited to inside a building, it just must be strict science,” or whatever they say, then the temptation will be over whelming to accept the so-called zero-option, the 50 percent cut, and ..

 

BUCKLEY:  Temptation to whom?

 

KISSINGER:  temptation to many elements in the Administration; to all those who have said Reykjavik is a big success, which unfortunately includes the President.

 

And that then an agreement will be made which I fear will be opposed by very few people because it incorporates “reductions”, the zero-option is something we, ourselves, proposed, together with the European allies, 

 

BUCKLEY: … all the shibboleths will be observed …

 

KISSINGER:  All the shibboleths will be observed, and then the Soviets will have “given up” on the laboratory testing.  And I think we would then be in a situation where, at a period of maximum Soviet weakness, we have agreed to limitations on our most advanced technology, if not the destruction of it, in return for a 50 percent cut which doesn’t mean anything. 

 

And then one has to ask oneself, “when ever, are we going to get a better agreement if we can’t get it now?”  And that is something that is going to be much more important, as you said in your introduction, as an issue in 1987, than the minutia of who said what to whom with respect to the Iran Arms Sales.

 

BUCKLEY: You wrote: “As a veteran of four summits, I get a sinking feeling when I read of fundamental agreements being drafted overnight on subjects never explored in preliminary conversations.  Nor do I think the United States and the Soviet Union were any near a completed agreement, much less a useful one.”  Now, you’re really saying something different.  You’re saying, “Ok, I disapprove as a matter of experience, in these extemporaneous discussions in which the future of the world  is disposed of, but between then and now, three or four months have passed, and between       six months or more will have passed,  Do we not then approach a situation in which there has been time to contemplate the weaknesses, of these basic agreements, and yet there seems not to be within the intellectual resources of the Reagan Administration the power to penetrate those weaknesses.”  How is that?

 

KISSINGER:  We are coming to the end of the Administration.  It is understandable that a President will feel that he wants to leave a mark.  And therefore, any agreement is better than no agreement, and many aspect of this agreement at a minimum don’t do any damage, a fifty-percent cut is at least a reversal of the so-called “arms race.”  

 

BUCKLEY:  But how could the President cope with your opposition, for instance?  With my opposition, with the opposition of Sam Nunn.  With the opposition of a hard-headed 34% Senators – maybe that’s more hardheaded senators than we have access to?    That kept SALT II from being enacted would come to the rescue.  Would Paul Nitze and that whole bunch all of a sudden turn their backs on their entire analytical scaffolding?  Would the past generation embrace this …. Crap?

 

KISSINGER:  I think probably you will find there’s a presidential election approaching, many …

 

BUCKLEY:  What interest can they have in a Presidential Election?

 

KISSINGER:  Not Paul Nitze, but many Republican senators feel that any agreement made by Ronald Reagan …  I don’t believe that this agreement that we have outlined here could possibly be put through by a Democratic president.

 

BUCKLEY:  Well, this is extremely interesting, and I would like you to elaborate on this.  It seems to me that instincts of survival, plus a basic sense of Realpolitik, ought to inform enough Americans critically situation, to mount massive resistance to an understanding of this kind, even if promulgated by a Republican president with a hard anti-communist background.  Under the circumstances, would I be safe in predicting that, if you were to package this, and present it to the Senate, there would be a tremendous resistance and that it would probably catapult the leader of that resistance into a primary position in the Republican primary contests?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

BUCKLEY: How do you handle the argument so frequently made that we have got to come to terms with the apocalyptic increase inherent in modern warfare—i.e., unless we struggle to put the genie back in the bottle, we are going to live in a situation in which apocalypse becomes technically possible. Do you simply answer that by saying, sure it's possible, but there's nothing we can do about the fact that it's possible? 

 

KISSINGER: No. I'm in favor of negotiating with the Soviets, but first of all I don't believe that the military component is the only, or indeed the principal element of international tension and I do not think that you can reduce tension simply by eliminating the military component. But with respect to the military component, what I ask for is that the proposals can demonstrably improve the situation. That should not be intellectually beyond the wit of man. I do not see why an agreement that makes no difference militarily should make a difference politically. Secondly, I think we have to face the fact that most of the tensions in the world have been caused by political decisions... 

 

KISSINGER: Gromyko was rather rigid and morbidly suspicious. Gromyko was like an African rhino who charged in a straight line, always quite predictably. Now they've got Dobrynin there, who was ambassador in Washington and who must have taught them that what you see is what you get, and you can afford to accept American proposals because they indeed may not be in the American interest. They may result from a bureaucratic compromise... 

 

KISSINGER: I have known the European leaders personally for a long time 

 

(This newsletter is prepared by the producers of FIRING LINE. Mr. Buckley is not consulted in any way in its preparation.) 

 

 

 

 

" ...A trillion here, a trillion there, and soon, you're talking about real money!.."

 ” Collection Title: Firing Line broadcast records Guest: Kissinger, Henry (1923-) Date Created: January 13, 1987

https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/6900

 

Collection Structure: Firing Line broadcast records > Episode guide> Afterthoughts on Reykjavik

 

Item Title: Afterthoughts on Reykjavik

 

 

Host: Buckley, William F., Jr.(1925-2008)

 

 

Description:

 

When in doubt, consult "no less than Talleyrand himself," as WFB puts it; and so … 

 

… to explicate Reykjavik and the European reaction to it, we're off on a bracing hour with the man who, agree with him or not, has seen more and done more in international affairs than anyone else now living. One sample from Mr. Kissinger: "Gromyko was rather rigid and morbidly suspicious. Gromyko was like an African rhino who charged in a straight line, always quite predictably. 

 

Now they've got Dobrynin there, who was ambassador in Washington and who must have taught them that “what you see is what you get, and you can afford to accept American proposals because they indeed may not be in the American interest. They may result from a bureaucratic compromise.”

 

Subject(s):

Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeevich, 1931-

Reagan, Ronald

Reagan-Gorbachev Summit Meeting, Reykjavik, Iceland, 1986

Place Recorded: New York City, New York, United States

 

Dimensions: Duration: 60 minutes

Format: Text

Medium: television programs

 

Hoover ID: Program S0723

Record Number: 80040.966

Notes: Video not currently available for purchase.

 

Collection Guide: https://oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/kt6m3nc88c

 

Rights: Copyright held by Stanford University. This copy is provided for educational and research purposes only. No publication, further reproduction, or reuse of copies, beyond fair use, may be made without the express written permission of the Hoover Institution Library & Archives on behalf of Stanford University.

 

Yale University Library

findit.library.yale.edu

 

E L63 

 

BUCKLEY:  Dr. Kissinger is, on top of everything else, a syndicated columnist, and his first commentary on the Reykjavik summit expressed much less than the enthusiasm so many feel at the prospect of the elimination of nuclear force from our lives. He outlined what he called three"components of the Reykjavik Revolution," and I think we will remind ourselves what these were, eliciting from him comments on them one at a time. 

 

The first was "an agreement to reduce strategic forces by 50 per cent, with a moratorium for 10 years on deployment of the Strategic Defense Initiative." 

 

[ Component (1): Fifty Percent Reduction]

 

Question: Dr. Kissinger, what's wrong with a 50 per cent reduction in strategic forces? Have you got a weakness for nuclear weapons? 

 

KISSINGER:  May I explain, first, my general approach to the issue.    [I believe that] the Reagan Administration and President Reagan, due to the restoration of American Self Confidence, the buildup of American Military force and a number of other steps he as taken, and due to the weakness, or at least domestic problems of the Soviet Union, is in a uniquely favorable negotiating position.  Indeed, one asks oneself, if we do not get a change in the situation out of this negotiating position, when, ever, are we going to get it?  

 

So, I would be dubious about any arrangement that does no better than leave things unchanged, and I would indeed be worried if the situation worsened.

 

Now, with respect to the “Fifty Percent Cut” my major concern is that it makes no significant difference in the strategic situation as it is.  Indeed from a “systems analyst’s” point of view, if it doesn’t make a difference, it slightly worsens the situation …

 

BUCKLEY:  Explain that, if you will.

 

KISSINGER:  There are three major problems with respect to strategic nuclear weapons.

 

[Three Major Problems with Nuclear Weapons Negotiations]

 

One, the possibility of surprise attack or a “first strike”.  

 

Second, the reliance on mass … on a strategy, of  “Mutual Assured Destruction”, which relies on heavy civilian casualties; and 

 

Third, a corollary of this, in fact it is more or less the same, so maybe there are two issues . . . the capacity for major civilian [infrastructure] destruction… 

 

[Deception of Surprise Attack]

 

With respect to the first, the launch of a surprise attack:  

 

[MIRV]

 

That is produced by the fact that modern missiles have multiple warheads, therefore, one missile can threaten several defending missiles, if it has ten warheads, it can threaten ten defending missiles. 

 

A fifty percent cut in missile forces that does not affect the number of warheads on each missiledoes NOT reduce the vulnerability of the missiles, in fact, it makes calculations with respect to attacking them simpler.  Because, now, there are fewer launchers that have to be attacked …

 

BUCKLEY:  For a first strike, therefore? …

 

KISSINGER:  … Therefore, it is technically easier to plan a first strike against fewer missiles as long as the ratio of warheads to missiles remains unchanged. As long as the ratio of warheads to missiles remains unchanged.

 

[Anti Submarine warfare]

 

Second, with respect to submarine launched missiles; no projected agreement takes care … includes antisubmarine forces.  Therefore, to cut our submarine force in half – and in fact it will have to be cut in more than half in order to achieve the limits – means that the same number of Soviet antisubmarine forces are now chasing

 

BUCKLEY:  … half as many …

 

KISSINGER: … half as many submarines. 

 

So, obviously, the vulnerability of submarines will increase.  

 

And all of this is purchased at no improvement to the vulnerability of civilian populations, because the number of warheads that will remain after a fifty percent cut, which is about five-to-six thousand, is twice as many as Kennedy had at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis.  

 

So, I believe that the fifty percent cut has some symbolic significance; some propagandistic significance; it does not make a significant, substantive, difference.  

 

If it stood by itself, I could live with it. 

 

BUCKLEY:  Umhmm

 

KISSINGER:  But I would not consider it a huge achievement.

 

BUCKLEY:  Well, I’m going to interrupt my own intended enumeration of the other two components, because of the way you answered that first question, to say that … to observes as follows:  Why is it that we have an administration whose own interests, to say nothing of those of “The Republic,” vests very heavily in realism, in evaluating the nature of the nuclear problem, encouraging the notion that a symbolic reduction is of any use whatever, given the fact that unless we reduce to the point of reaching the apocalyptic threshold, which would be … what? … a reduction of 97 or 98 percent, in fact, we do not enhance the probable safety of the civilian population.  In fact, as you just analyzed, we’re probably going in the other direction.

 

So, why would something as rudimentary as what you have analyzed not be shot-down instantly by sober thought?

 

KISSINGER:  May I make just one technical point before I answer that question?

 

BUCKLEY:  Sure.

 

[Deception]

 

KISSINGER:  The technical point would be that if it were possible, for example, to eliminate multiple warheads, then if we were in a single-warhead world, or if we returned to a single-warhead world, then at least the danger of a first-strike could be reduced, but you are quite right.  The vulnerability of the civilian population would not be affected until you reached a very unre- … a limit so low that you cannot really imagine it as part of an arms control agreement, because it would be so close to zero, that it would then raise the question of how many weapons can be hidden.

                            

BUCKLEY:  Right.

 

[Question of What is ‘Minimum Force’ assuming deception]

 

KISSINGER:  And, you’d be right back to the original problem of “what is a minimum force?”  

 

Now, how was it possible that the Reagan Administration that used to castigate its … for its obsession with arms control, and that, certainly, in its assessment of Soviet Intentions has been very rigorous.  How could it get into this position?

 

I think there are many explanations.  One is, at the end of the day, any president wants to go down in history as having made progress towards peace.  And in the American mythology “Peace” is often considered a static condition in which tensions have disappeared . . .

 

BUCKLEY:  Yes, and there’s an aspect of the size of the arsenal …

 

KISSINGER:  … That’s right … so therefore, he will look, as time goes on, for some agreement…  But Why This Agreement?  Well, with all respect, many of the original supporters of President Reagan used to attack the Arms Control negotiations of his predecessors on the grounds that they only froze the existing programs and did not REDUCE them.  So that “Reductions” became an article of faith of many of the original supporters of President Reagan’s.  So that, within the Administration, almost anything that can be represented as a “Reduction” seems to validate the original goal.

 

BUCKLEY:  So, it’s the tyranny of the superstitious symbol that tends to take over.

 

 

[Fallacies of ‘Least Damage’ and ‘Negotiating within the Bureaucracy’]

 

KISSINGER:  Yes.  Now, this is what the Administration is faced with in terms of its own rhetoric.  The Government departments, especially the State Department, the Arms Control Agency, and so forth, they are in favor, fundamentally, of any agreement that can be negotiated.  So, they tend to look around for the various proposals that, in their view, do least damage to American interests, since they believe that an “Agreement” is desirable in itself. 

 

[Problem of intra-bureaucracy negotiation] 

 

And then, usually a struggle develops – between those who want negotiation and those who are very suspicious – which the President has to resolve as the negotiation approaches.

 

And, all the bureaucratic pressures are in the direction of accepting that which, at a minimum, he considers doesn’t do any damage.

 

BUCKLEY:  To what extent was this a fact in causing acquiescence in SALT I?

 

KISSINGER:  In SALT I … of course, we had a totally difference domestic situation.  In SALT I, we had a shrinking defense budget imposed on us by the Congress.  We could not get approval of any new program, and the Soviets were building.   But it was a factor in the sense that the Nixon Administration, in which I served, became convinced that the Ballistic Missile Defense which we were building at the time was on the verge of being gutted by the Congress, that had already reduced it from twelve defense sites to two, so that one was looking around for a solution that, at least, rescued something. 

 

It’s not exactly analogous to the present situation.  But any President, including the ones I served, if he is not very careful, will find himself confronted with imminent deadlines and with proposals that he is reluctant to reject because, if they don’t do obvious damage, you have a proclivity to go along with them.

 

BUCKLEY:  Well, given the tyranny of numbers here, and the widely held superstition that 49 is that much better than 50; and 48 is that much better than 49; how do you account for the enthusiasm for SALT I and SALT II, given the demonstrated record that, in fact, there was a huge increase in warheads following both … well, I won’t call the second one a “Treaty” since it was never confirmed, but following the first treaty and the second signature?

 

KISSINGER:  Since you are asking the person who was in office when SALT I was being negotiated … and since I don’t want to establish the principle of admitting a mistake on television, 

 

BUCKLEY:  [Laughing] … Or anywhere else …

 

KISSINGER:  … I will have to explain, ah, what WE thought we were doing.  After all, fifteen years have passed since then.  In 1972, we faced the problem that the Soviets were building some 200 missiles per year, and we could not get any additional programs through the Congress.  We had the Vietnam War, we had a big Peace Movement in the United States, so we considered it a considerable accomplishment that we froze the numbers of launchers at the levels which had then been reached.

 

BUCKLEY:  Without anticipating that they had MIRVed them?

 

KISSINGER:  No, no.  We were MIRVing …

 

BUCKLEY: … I know we were …

 

[Deception – more launchers meant Second Strike more Difficult]

 

KISSINGER:  and that gave us a certain numerical … ahh … compensation for their larger numbers.  We thought they would MIRV, and we thought we had … the SALT I agreement was for five years, during the course of which a permanent agreement was to be negotiated.   And, in the course of that, we were going to take account of the MIRV problem.  And, indeed, as soon as SALT I was signed, we made a whole series of proposals to limit the number of MIRVed missiles, all of which the Soviet Union rejected.

 

So, we then witnessed, NOT an increase in the number of launchers, but an increase in the number of warheads that could be put on launchers.  And that genie has never been put back into the bottle. And therefore  in 1987, we face a totally difference situation from the one we faced in 1972, when we were compensating with multiple warheads for the larger number of Soviet launchers.  

 

BUCKLEY:  It nevertheless is correct, is it not, that people are constantly saying about President Reagan, “you see, he’s never concluded an Arms Limitation Agreement, and by contrast, Carter did,” (even though it was not confirmed by the Senate), and by contrast Nixon did, and this is a kind of a thoughtless indictment, is it not?

 

KISSINGER:  I am not …[worried?] …  what President Reagan has done up til now in Arms Control Negotiations.  I’m worried about what he might do in the future.  I am worried about the agreement that he might sign, not about an agreement he has not signed.

 

BUCKLEY:  Okay, 

 

KISSINGER:  But it’s not a fair indictment, to answer your question.

 

[Component (2): Withdrawal of all MRBMs from Europe]

 

BICKLEY:  Quite right, let’s continue with the other two components as you listed them of the Reykjavik Agreement.  The second was an agreement to withdraw US and Soviet missiles of ranges of 1500 kilometers from Western Europe and European Russia.   Now, your skepticism about THAT “component” is based on what?

 

KISSINGER:  My skepticism about that is based on the political situation in Europe; and on the theory on which the deployment of medium range missiles to Europe was based to begin with.  The problem Europe faces with respect to nuclear weapons is that the Soviet Union can attack Europe from 1) its own territory, 2) from its satellite territory, with weapons of various ranges.  

 

The United States cannot retaliate against the Soviet Union from Europe.   Therefore, the problem arises in the mind of the Europeans – and maybe in the minds of the Soviets – whether, in the case of a nuclear threat confined to Europe, the United States would retaliate from American soil!  Especially in light of the situation we discussed earlier, where any war is likely to involve scores of millions of casualties in a matter of days in a nuclear war.  

 

So, the deployment of medium range ballistic missiles to Europe, one, created a condition in which an attack on Europe would produce a retaliation FROM Europe; and secondly, would make the retaliation against the Soviet Union completely automatic, because it would be unlikely that the United States would permit its weapons in Europe to be attacked without using them.   And it would be improbable that the United States would permit a conventional attack to overrun these weapons without using them. 

 

[Link U.S. and Allies’ defenses in an ‘organic manner’]

 

So, these weapons were a way to couple the defense of Europe to the Defense of the United States in an organic manner.

 

Secondly, every European country paid a heavy domestic price, in the face of massive demonstrations, strongly supported by the Soviet Union, in 1982 and 83, when these weapons were being …

 

BUCKLEY:  … deployed …

 

KISSINGER --- deployed.  Now, less than three years later, the United States offers to withdrawal of its weapons, in return for the Soviets withdrawing weapons of comparable ranges.

 

BUCKLEY:  Mmm-hmm  

 

[Withdrawing MRBMs, No USSR threat reduction to Europe, yet US counter- threat is eliminated]

 

KISSINGER:  But that doesn’t solve the European problem, because there are about, I think about 350 [Soviet] medium range weapons that can threaten Europe, but there are about [Soviet] 850 short-range weapons that can also cover all of Europe, plus hundreds of [Soviet] intercontinental weapons that can threaten Europe.  

 

So, the nuclear threat to Europe is barely diminished, but American presence which could react to that threat is totally eliminated – POINT ONE.

 

POINT TWO:  All the European governments that paid a horrendous price domestically for getting these weapons in, now have to explain why they paid a price to get these weapons introduced, and why the fundamental factors that produced a need for them is not eliminated.

 

Now, it is true that in 1982, the “Zero Option” was offered by all of the Allies, the option that is now being implemented. But, I think one had to be sophisticated enough to understand the Bureaucratic lineup.  It was put forward in America by our Defense Department, which was extremely skeptical …

 

BUCKLEY:  … on the assumption that it wouldn’t be accepted.

 

[US DoD misled that USSR will believe US deception]

 

KISSINGER:  … and it wasn’t accepted, for two reasons.  We didn’t have any weapons there to begin with, and the Soviets didn’t want to trade 400 [weapons] for nothing.  And secondly because Gromyko was rather rigid and morbidly suspicious. Gromyko was like an African rhino who charged in a straight line, always quite predictably. Now they've got Dobrynin there, who was ambassador in Washington and who must have taught them that “what you see is what you get, and you can afford to accept American proposals because they indeed may not be in the American interest. They may result from a bureaucratic compromise.”

 

So, now, I have seen the other day that the Secretary of State said in The New York Times, that we’ve done no more than implement what the Europeans have accepted.  Which is true.  But, the Europeans never thought it would happen!

 

BUCKLEY:  [Laughing] Yeah! 

 

[Allies’ must be included in nuclear talks]

 

KISSINGER:  … and they sort of looked to us to save them 

 

BUCKLEY:  … to abort it …

 

KISSINGER:  … to abort it, and now they are stuck with a situation where they cannot admit they are uneasy, but they ARE uneasy.

 

BUCKLEY:  In fact, they HAVE admitted that they’re uneasy, haven’t they?

 

KISSINGER:  They have admitted…. Well, not as strongly as they feel.

 

BUCKLEY: Among other things, Mitterrand has said he would not cooperate in any such venture, which technically invalidates it, because with the Reykjavik [pronounces it “Rek-DZHA-vik”] terms… didn’t they require compliance with? …

 

KISSINGER:  NO!  There was another point.  In addition to the removal of American missiles, the United States seems to have proposed “Reykjavík” … forgive me for not pronouncing it accurately …. ahh … or maybe you’re not pronouncing it accurately … 

 

BUCKLEY:  [Laughter]

 

KISSINGER: … the American side seems to have proposed at Reykjavík that ALL strategic missiles would be eliminated.  That would then touch on our strategic missiles, as well as the British and French missile forces.  

 

Now, Mitterand has made absolutely clear, as has Mrs. Thatcher, that under no circumstances would they agree to that part of the proposal.  And, I don’t know whether we consider that proposal to be on the table.   But the Zero American and Soviet missiles technically does not affect …

 

BUCKLEY:  Do the 1500-kilometer ones have to do with missiles that we have total sovereignty over? 

 

KISSINGER:  exactly

 

BUCKLEY:  so we can with draw them … however … is it not correct that before Mr. Reagan got back from RAKE … ZHA vik … ah … there were instantaneous protests in London and in Paris and in West Germany … over the implications ….

 

KISSINGER :  absolutely 

 

BUCKLEY:  They recognize this linkage factor to which you just referred.  

 

KISSINGER:  … of coupling the defense of Europe with the defense of the

 

BUCKLEY: … yes, you said 

 

KISSINGER:  … I have known the European leaders personally for a long time, and I will assert flatly that I know none now in office, with maybe one or two—

 

BUCKLEY: Scandinavian exceptions?

 

KISSINGER: None of the major countries -- is at ease about the withdrawal of American missiles from Europe, even in return for the withdrawal of a certain category of Soviet missiles, even though for domestic reasons they cannot attack it as all out as they feel... 

 

BUCKLEY:  Before we go back to that and generalize, let me, for the sake of form, mention the third component which you quoted as follows:  “An American proposal to do away with all ballistic missiles over a ten-year period, countered by a Soviet proposal to do away with all strategic forces, or, in its even more exalted form, all nuclear weapons,” … now we’re getting into real “Angelism” aren’t we?   However, it was on the table at Reykjavik, the idea of eliminating all nuclear bombs, coupled with the ironic point that only then would we be permitted to deploy SDI, right?

 

[ Component (3): Elimination of BMD]

 

KISSINGER: yes..

 

BUCKLEY:  … when it was useless.  Now, is that third component simply to be dismissed, given the number of holes in it, which you went on to analyze in your essay as simply an exercise in idealistic exuberance?  For the sake of, ah, 

                                                        

[Deception]

 

KISISNGER:  what was worrisome about the proposal was that the United States could even conceive making it in the present circumstances, because, even assuming that the Soviets had accepted the elimination of all missiles, we would then be in a world of airplanes, again, in which now, I think most people agree that Soviet air defenses are so strong, that if you cannot attack it with missiles, it’s questionable whether you can get through with airplanes.  

 

At least many experts would have serious questions about it.  Conversely, we have no air defense at all!   And all the problems I’ve mentioned about the number of warheads on a missile are made more acute because there are many more airplanes on any one airfield than there are warheads on a missile.  So, it’s relatively easier to attack the fifty or seventy-five airfields we have in the absence of an American air defense.  So the ironical result of this position would be that, if we were serious about it, we would have to spend a lot of money building air defense against airplanes if we’re not going to be totally vulnerable.

 

BUCKLEY:  Is there something missing here? Are you saying that nuclear power is required to fuel an SDI defense?  Because I would have thought an SDI defense would be extremely useful against airplanes.  They’re slower …

 

KISSINGER:  SDI Defense … ahhh …. It depends what kind of an SDI defense you’re talking about.  I would have though that most of the space-based components of SDI would NOT be all that useful against aircraft.

 

BUCKLEY:  Why not?

 

KISSINGER:  Because … I’m no technical expert … my understanding has been that they’re aimed at trajectories that go very high, there are various phases of interception, that depend on [tracking] the “boost phase” which has certain energy components that are quite different from aircraft.  I have never heard the argument…

 

BUCKLEY:  I don’t want to correct you technically, but the SDI enthusiasts are telling us that they would be effective even for cruise missiles, in which case they would surely be effective against airplanes because they are atmospheric missiles.  

 

KISSINGER:  There are some components of SDI that would be effective against airplanes, what is called the so-called “terminal defense” … That should be effective against airplanes, but I think you would need a different configuration a different type of radar … but that’s not my major point.

 

My major point is quite different.  

 

One:  that proposal seems to have been made without any study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of what the military implications of such a world would be.

 

[REDUCES DETERRENCE]

 

Secondly:  the combination of all the proposals which you listed has the practical consequence of reducing, if not eliminating, the concept of “deterrence” that has governed the postwar world for thirty-to-forty years, which means that in case of a major attack on Europe, it would be highly probable, if not certain, that the United States would use nuclear weapons.  

 

That’s already been degraded by the kind of missile technology, but when you get into an airplane world, in which the use of these weapons, and even the targets, become infinitely more problematical.  It was the common view of almost all military experts that I know, that we would then need a totally different concept of the defense of Europe, quite at variance with the one that now exists.

 

BUCKLEY:  The one which you outlined, you said (A) would take fifteen years.  You said it would take 15 years to match the defensive power of the Soviet Union.   Secondly, it’s politically inconceivable that the sacrifices would be volunteered without such a conventional …

 

KISSINGER:  In every …

 

[Deception]

 

BUCKLEY:  You don’t talk about diminishing your deterrent power while that is problematic, do you?

 

KISSINGER:  In all, it consists of pressures to reduce the defense …

 

BUCKLEY:  Yeah, …

 

KISSINGER:   And the amount of prevention of weapons, it turns out, is extremely costly, drafts would have to be re-introduced in countries which do not now have a draft.  And at the end of this process, you would have to say that it’s the reality that after three-to-four hundred years it was never possible to establish a conventional balance that was plausible, hence there has been with conventional weapons very frequent wars.  Because, even if you had an equality of numbers, military history shows that the side that can concentrate its forces at a particular point, may be able to achieve a breakthrough or may BELIEVE it can achieve a breakthrough . ..  

 

BUCKLEY:  Well, how do you account for the phenomenon of the nineteenth century?

 

KISSINGER:  Well, in the nineteenth century, you had a number of wars, but you had minor wars, in the nineteenth century you had a combination of a balance of power which was rather artfully put together, together with the fact that, for one of the few times in history, the major governments had comparable domestic structures, so they did not feel ideologically threatened by other countries.  It is the one period in which conventional balances were maintained.

 

BUT, as soon as the ideological component began to disappear and as soon as there was a fundamental antagonism between France and Germany, so that the flexibility of these balances, and of the shifting alliances, disappeared, you got an armaments race which then, in time, triggered mobilization schedules, which in turn contributed importantly to World War I.

 

BUCKLEY:  Therefore, there is no sense in which the Nineteenth Century gave us a model which could be reconstructed given the differences in the ideological …

 

KISSINGER:  You have to remember, World War I which killed 20 million people, started to wild enthusiasm and every general staff must have believed they were going to win the War or they wouldn’t have entered it.  And, so, it cannot be in our interest to recreate a world in which at some moment huge armies with much more destructive weapons descend upon each other, especially as the knowledge of nuclear weapons cannot be suppressed by any of the schemes that have been discussed at Reykjavik and elsewhere.

 

BUCKLEY:  Yes, and the Second World War was a conventional war in which 55 million people were killed.

 

KISSINGER:  Exactly.

 

BUCKLEY:  Let me ask you this:  How do you handle, Mr. Kissinger, the argument so frequently made that we’ve got to come to terms with the apocalyptic increase inherent in modern warfare, i.e., unless we struggle to put the genie back into the bottle, we are going to live in a situation in which the Apocalypse becomes technically possible.  Do you answer that by saying, “Sure, it’s possible but there’s nothing we can do about the fact that it’s possible”?

 

[Deception: Nuclear Weapons are not the only or indeed the principle element of international tension]

 

KISSINGER:  No.  I’m in favor of negotiating with the Soviets, but I believe that they are … first of all, I don’t believe that the military component is the only, or indeed the principal, element of international tension, and I do not think you can reduce tension simply by manipulating the military component.  

 

[An Arms Control Agreement, to be advantageous, must IMPROVE the situation]

 

But with respect to the military component, what I ask for is that the proposals can demonstrably improve the situation.  They should not be intellectually beyond the wit of man.  I do not see why an agreement that makes no difference militarily should make a difference politically. 

 

Secondly, we have to face the fact that the tensions in the world have been caused by political decisions.  There is no law of nature that says that Soviet Union has to support a heavily militarized Cuba, that it has to put $600 million of economic and military aid into Nicaragua, or putting a billion dollars worth of arms into Angola, of fuelling the invasion with it’s political and military support.  In short, I’m saying that if the Soviet Union is prepared to stay within its own boundaries which, after all, is the greatest landmass in the world, so they’re not excessively constricting.   If they’re willing to stay within these boundaries, if they’re willing to accept some principles of restraint, and if that is coupled with some arms control agreements that make a genuine difference, then we can say we have achieved something.  

 

BUCKLEY:  Well. . . What kind of shrinkage would you applaud?  Well, de-MIRVing would be one, wouldn’t it?

 

 

[Deception – De-MIRVing] 

 

KISSINGER:  I believe de-MIRVing would be one.

 

BUCKLEY:  is that enforceable?

 

KISSINGER:  One would have to ask technicians. Since, now we’re living with restrictions on MIRVs and since we seem to be comfortable with that, it would seem to me easier in a de-MIRVed world.  I’m assuming it is enforceable, and if I am shown to be wrong on this then I  …

[Deception – Theatre Nuclear Weapons]

 

BUCKLEY:  By contrast, you said, that what would NOT be enforceable would be the end of theater nuclear weapons. They’re too easy to hide, aren’t they?

 

KISSINGER: … abolishing all nuclear weapons, because the first thing you would have to study is how many can be hidden and    how many would have to be conserved for the contingency of hidden weapons.  And you’d be right back to negotiating the minimum level of weapons. 

 

But I would add to this a component which we haven’t discussed, namely the Strategic Defenses.  I do not understand the argument that says Arms Control has to start by banning weapons that do not yet exist … 

 

[Strategic Defenses: 1) don’t yet exist; and 2) are defensive]

 

BUCKLEY:  … which are defensive in nature?

 

KISSINGER:  Which are defensive in nature.  Weapons that are aimed at weapons are supposed to be dangerous, while weapons that are aimed at people are supposed to be constructive and contributing to stability, so, as a concept for discussion, I would say if one could negotiate a balance between offensive and defensive forces so that the possibility of surprise attacks are eliminated or sharply reduced, and an attack on civilian populations would require such a massive assault as to be discouraged by its magnitude, then one would have made a contribution …

 

BUCKLEY: So, think of it in terms of units.  In other words, if you increase the units of offensive potential, you also increase the units of defensive potential.

 

 

[Deception: Long Moratorium means Pentagon reluctant to ask for funds, Congress reluctant to give them]

 

KISSINGER:  And conversely, [crosstalk] … And on that level, I’d be perfectly willing to admit Strategic Defense.  What makes me extremely uneasy about this Strategic Defense negotiation, and very uneasy if Reykjavik should be come the model for the future, which I fear it may become, is the combination of a very long moratorium on deployment which means the military will be very reluctant to ask for money, the Congress will be reluctant to appropriate it, coupled with restrictions on scientific research, even if “laboratory tests” are being defined to cover research outside the laboratory –

 

 -- a restriction on research must weigh more heavily on the United States than on the Soviet Union.  You know the restrictions will be much more heavily policed by the United States, by the Congress, by the scientific community, and we would err on the side of excessive strictness.

 

In the Soviet Union, what is “SDI Research” and what is “Civilian Research”, these lines are going to be eroded so that evolution can go in only one direction.  Either the Soviets will score a breakthrough, or its technically beyond them, but in any event, they have an absolute safety net.  

 

And, I’m opposed to limitations on research of any kind.  Limitations on deployment can be observed.  Limitations on research are beyond our …

 

BUCKLEY: … or on testing?

 

KISSINGER:  Or on testing.

 

BUCKLEY:  Now, it has gone, relatively speaking, widely unremarked, the emphasis the Soviet Union is placing right now on defensive mechanisms, right?  That is to say, $25 billion a year is a studied estimate of what they’re spending right now, while we are begrudging $4 billion a year on our own SDI.  

 

KISSINGER: Somebody made as study of Soviet scientific delegations that visit the United States, agitating against American strategic defense and found that 80% of the delegations members are working on the Soviet Strategic Defense program.

 

The Difference is, that the Soviets being behind us in certain aspects of technology have concentrated their strategic defense on surface based weapons.  

 

We have emphasized space-based weapons, and that is what they are really attacking in their SDI criticism.

 

BUCKLEY:  You say we’ve emphasized space-based weapons, in the sense that the ABM, the old ABMs , were concentrated on “terminal defense.”  That’s right?

 

KISSINGER:  The old ABM was based on terminal defense, in what was called, um, at any rate not space … they were launched from the ground. 

 

BUCKLEY:  Yes, but you’re not suggesting that they’re not also preparing for the atmospheric …

 

KISSINGER:  That presumes a capacity to miniaturize their components, which they haven’t achieved.

 

BUCKLEY:  Well, not, the Krasnoyarsk Radar site, which people have decided is a direct violation of the ABM Treaty, is designed, is it not, as a space-based SDI …  isn’t it?

 

[Deception]

 

KISSINGER:  It can be used for many purposes.  That radar site, which is about a thousand miles from where it’s permitted to be…  In the ABM Treaty of 1972, there was a provision that all radars had to be located at the periphery, it could be warning radars, but not battle management radars.  If they are located in the interior of the country they can then follow the trajectory of the missiles into the country, and they can therefore be hooked up with terminal defenses at a minimum.  No doubt, it would also be useful for space-based defense, but it is even a total violation of the agreement of 1972 with respect to the locations of radar sites.  

 

Now, the Soviets claim that this is a space-tracking radar station, and is therefore permitted under the agreement.  If this is true, it is the first space-tracking station oriented towards the horizon.

 

BUCKLEY: [laughter] … yeah … they never let us down, do they? The Soviets.

 

KISSINGER:  And this is something that’s the size of three football fields, and that they started building in 1980 long before any SDI concept was ever developed in the United States. And they continued building and for which there can be no conceivable justification in terms of the ABM Treaty of 1972. 

 

BUCKLEY:  Given that you’ve said that, and before I come to the concluding point of order I want to ventilate, you said you could understand prolonging from six months to one year, the period in order to serve notice that we were departing from the ABM Treaty.  Six months is what is incorporated into that understanding.

Now, I’m advised by legal scholars, that a Treaty, for instance, this particular one, could be terminated either by saying “ok, a six month countdown is beginning now, and next September we’re going to feel free to do what we want to do,”  or we can say “it’s null and void because you have not lived up to your obligations”  as you’ve just finished documenting, they have not.  So technically, tomorrow, we could terminate …

 

KISSINGER:  Oh yes …

 

BUCKLEY:  You have no quarrel with that?

 

KISSINGER:  I have no quarrel.  If you consider it in our interests to do …

 

BUCKLEY:  Yes.

 

KISSINGER: If I may make one point, since I don’t keep the time, I don’t know whether we are approaching the end.

 

BUCKLEY:  We have ten minutes.

 

KISSINGER:  Oh … the importance, if I may say so, of this discussion, is not just to beat to death what happened at Reykjavik.  My nightmare is that right after the German elections, the Soviets are going to make a proposal in which they package together more or less all the items they agreed to at Reykjavik, and make it read … Reykjavik broke down on the issue that they wanted to ban laboratory tests, and also the issue they obviously didn’t bank on the fact that President Reagan would pack up his delegation and leave. So, which was the best thing he did there.

 

Supposing they come back and say, “laboratory isn’t limited to inside a building, it just must be strict science,” or whatever they say, then the temptation will be over whelming to accept the so-called zero-option, the 50 percent cut, and ..

 

BUCKLEY:  Temptation to whom?

 

KISSINGER:  temptation to many elements in the Administration; to all those who have said Reykjavik is a big success, which unfortunately includes the President.

 

And that then an agreement will be made which I fear will be opposed by very few people because it incorporates “reductions”, the zero-option is something we, ourselves, proposed, together with the European allies, 

 

BUCKLEY: … all the shibboleths will be observed …

 

KISSINGER:  All the shibboleths will be observed, and then the Soviets will have “given up” on the laboratory testing.  And I think we would then be in a situation where, at a period of maximum Soviet weakness, we have agreed to limitations on our most advanced technology, if not the destruction of it, in return for a 50 percent cut which doesn’t mean anything. 

 

And then one has to ask oneself, “when ever, are we going to get a better agreement if we can’t get it now?”  And that is something that is going to be much more important, as you said in your introduction, as an issue in 1987, than the minutia of who said what to whom with respect to the Iran Arms Sales.

 

BUCKLEY: You wrote: “As a veteran of four summits, I get a sinking feeling when I read of fundamental agreements being drafted overnight on subjects never explored in preliminary conversations.  Nor do I think the United States and the Soviet Union were any near a completed agreement, much less a useful one.”  Now, you’re really saying something different.  You’re saying, “Ok, I disapprove as a matter of experience, in these extemporaneous discussions in which the future of the world  is disposed of, but between then and now, three or four months have passed, and between       six months or more will have passed,  Do we not then approach a situation in which there has been time to contemplate the weaknesses, of these basic agreements, and yet there seems not to be within the intellectual resources of the Reagan Administration the power to penetrate those weaknesses.”  How is that?

 

KISSINGER:  We are coming to the end of the Administration.  It is understandable that a President will feel that he wants to leave a mark.  And therefore, any agreement is better than no agreement, and many aspect of this agreement at a minimum don’t do any damage, a fifty-percent cut is at least a reversal of the so-called “arms race.”  

 

BUCKLEY:  But how could the President cope with your opposition, for instance?  With my opposition, with the opposition of Sam Nunn.  With the opposition of a hard-headed 34% Senators – maybe that’s more hardheaded senators than we have access to?    That kept SALT II from being enacted would come to the rescue.  Would Paul Nitze and that whole bunch all of a sudden turn their backs on their entire analytical scaffolding?  Would the past generation embrace this …. Crap?

 

KISSINGER:  I think probably you will find there’s a presidential election approaching, many …

 

BUCKLEY:  What interest can they have in a Presidential Election?

 

KISSINGER:  Not Paul Nitze, but many Republican senators feel that any agreement made by Ronald Reagan …  I don’t believe that this agreement that we have outlined here could possibly be put through by a Democratic president.

 

BUCKLEY:  Well, this is extremely interesting, and I would like you to elaborate on this.  It seems to me that instincts of survival, plus a basic sense of Realpolitik, ought to inform enough Americans critically situation, to mount massive resistance to an understanding of this kind, even if promulgated by a Republican president with a hard anti-communist background.  Under the circumstances, would I be safe in predicting that, if you were to package this, and present it to the Senate, there would be a tremendous resistance and that it would probably catapult the leader of that resistance into a primary position in the Republican primary contests?

 

BUCKLEY: How do you handle the argument so frequently made that we have got to come to terms with the apocalyptic increase inherent in modern warfare—i.e., unless we struggle to put the genie back in the bottle, we are going to live in a situation in which apocalypse becomes technically possible. Do you simply answer that by saying, sure it's possible, but there's nothing we can do about the fact that it's possible? 

 

KISSINGER: No. I'm in favor of negotiating with the Soviets, but first of all I don't believe that the military component is the only, or indeed the principal element of international tension and I do not think that you can reduce tension simply by eliminating the military component. But with respect to the military component, what I ask for is that the proposals can demonstrably improve the situation. That should not be intellectually beyond the wit of man. I do not see why an agreement that makes no difference militarily should make a difference politically. Secondly, I think we have to face the fact that most of the tensions in the world have been caused by political decisions... 

 

KISSINGER: Gromyko was rather rigid and morbidly suspicious. Gromyko was like an African rhino who charged in a straight line, always quite predictably. Now they've got Dobrynin there, who was ambassador in Washington and who must have taught them that what you see is what you get, and you can afford to accept American proposals because they indeed may not be in the American interest. They may result from a bureaucratic compromise... 

 

KISSINGER: I have known the European leaders personally for a long time 

 

(This newsletter is prepared by the producers of FIRING LINE. Mr. Buckley is not consulted in any way in its preparation.) 

 

 

 

 

" ...A trillion here, a trillion there, and soon, you're talking about real money!.."